QUESTION 11: OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL
We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four points
(1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?
(2) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to
(3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?
(4) Whether it is only of the end possessed?
Article 1: Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?
Objection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs not only to the appetitive
power. For to enjoy seems nothing else than to receive the fruit. But it
is the intellect, in whose act Happiness consists, as shown above (Question , Article ), that receives the fruit of human life, which is Happiness.
Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power, but of the
Objection 2: Further, each power has its proper end, which is its perfection:
thus the end of sight is to know the visible; of the hearing, to
perceive sounds; and so forth. But the end of a thing is its fruit.
Therefore to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only to the appetite.
Objection 3: Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight. But sensible
delight belongs to sense, which delights in its object: and for the same
reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore
enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive, and not to the appetitive power.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4; and De Trin. x,
10,11): "To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake."
But love belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore also to enjoy is an
act of the appetitive power.
I answer that, "Fruitio" [enjoyment] and "fructus" [fruit] seem to refer
to the same, one being derived from the other; which from which, matters
not for our purpose; though it seems probable that the one which is more
clearly known, was first named. Now those things are most manifest to us
which appeal most to the senses: wherefore it seems that the word
"fruition" is derived from sensible fruits. But sensible fruit is that
which we expect the tree to produce in the last place, and in which a
certain sweetness is to be perceived. Hence fruition seems to have
relation to love, or to the delight which one has in realizing the
longed-for term, which is the end. Now the end and the good is the object
of the appetitive power. Wherefore it is evident that fruition is the act
of the appetitive power.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging,
under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly the vision of
God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is
the object of the will. And as such is the fruition thereof: so that the
intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but the will as the
motive power, moving (the powers) towards the end and enjoying the end
Reply to Objection 2: The perfection and end of every other power is contained in
the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is contained in the
common, as stated above (Question , Article ). Hence the perfection and end of
each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power.
Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other powers to their ends; and
itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end.
Reply to Objection 3: In delight there are two things: perception of what is
becoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive power; and complacency in
that which is offered as becoming: and this belongs to the appetitive
power, in which power delight is formally completed.
Article 2: Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone. For Augustine
says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) that "it is given to us men to enjoy and
to use." Therefore other animals cannot enjoy.
Objection 2: Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational animals
cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them to enjoy.
Objection 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the
intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath the sensitive.
If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite, it seems that
for the same reason it can belong to the natural appetite. But this is
evidently false, since the latter cannot delight in anything. Therefore
the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy: and accordingly enjoyment is not
possible for irrational animals.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 30): "It is not so absurd
to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily pleasure."
I answer that, As was stated above (Article ) to enjoy is not the act of the
power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that commands
the achievement; for it has been said to belong to the appetitive power.
Now things void of reason have indeed a power of achieving an end by way
of execution, as that by which a heavy body has a downward tendency,
whereas a light body has an upward tendency. Yet the power of command in
respect of the end is not in them, but in some higher nature, which moves
all nature by its command, just as in things endowed with knowledge, the
appetite moves the other powers to their acts. Wherefore it is clear that
things void of knowledge, although they attain an end, have no enjoyment
of the end: this is only for those that are endowed with knowledge.
Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect
knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is the
end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and the
good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On the
other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the good are
known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational animals: whose
appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are moved according to
a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend. Consequently, enjoyment
belongs to the rational nature, in a perfect degree; to irrational
animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, not at all.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 2: Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply; but of that
which each one chooses for his last end.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge; not so the
natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge.
Reply to Objection 4: Augustine is speaking there of imperfect enjoyment. This is
clear from his way of speaking: for he says that "it is not so absurd to
suppose that even beasts enjoy," that is, as it would be, if one were to
say that they "use."
Article 3: Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?
Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end. For the
Apostle says (Philem. 20): "Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in the Lord."
But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in a man.
Therefore to enjoy is not only of the last end.
Objection 2: Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says (Gal. 5:22): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," and other like
things, which are not in the nature of the last end. Therefore enjoyment
is not only of the last end.
Objection 3: Further, the acts of the will reflect on one another; for I will
to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the will: since
"it is the will with which we enjoy," as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10).
Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment. But the last end of man is not
enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. Therefore
enjoyment is not only of the last end.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "A man does not enjoy
that which he desires for the sake of something else." But the last end
alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else.
Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone.
I answer that, As stated above (Article ) the notion of fruit implies two
things: first that it should come last; second, that it should calm the
appetite with a certain sweetness and delight. Now a thing is last either
simply or relatively; simply, if it be referred to nothing else;
relatively, if it is the last in a particular series. Therefore that
which is last simply, and in which one delights as in the last end, is
properly called fruit; and this it is that one is properly said to enjoy.
But that which is delightful not in itself, but is desired, only as
referred to something else, e.g. a bitter potion for the sake of health,
can nowise be called fruit. And that which has something delightful about
it, to which a number of preceding things are referred, may indeed by
called fruit in a certain manner; but we cannot be said to enjoy it
properly or as though it answered perfectly to the notion of fruit. Hence
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10) that "we enjoy what we know, when the
delighted will is at rest therein." But its rest is not absolute save in
the possession of the last end: for as long as something is looked for,
the movement of the will remains in suspense, although it has reached
something. Thus in local movement, although any point between the two
terms is a beginning and an end, yet it is not considered as an actual
end, except when the movement stops there.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 33), "if he had
said, 'May I enjoy thee,' without adding 'in the Lord,' he would seem to
have set the end of his love in him. But since he added that he set his
end in the Lord, he implied his desire to enjoy Him": as if we were to
say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother not as a term but as a
Reply to Objection 2: Fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore it, and
another to man that enjoys it. To the tree indeed that bore it, it is
compared as effect to cause; to the one enjoying it, as the final object
of his longing and the consummation of his delight. Accordingly these
fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called because they are certain
effects of the Holy Ghost in us, wherefore they are called "fruits of the
spirit": but not as though we are to enjoy them as our last end. Or we
may say with Ambrose that they are called fruits because "we should
desire them for their own sake": not indeed as though they were not
ordained to the last end; but because they are such that we ought to find
pleasure in them.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Question , Article ; Question , Article ), we speak of an
end in a twofold sense: first, as being the thing itself; secondly, as
the attainment thereof. These are not, of course, two ends, but one end,
considered in itself, and in its relation to something else. Accordingly
God is the last end, as that which is ultimately sought for: while the
enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end. And so, just as God is
not one end, and the enjoyment of God, another: so it is the same
enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of
God. And the same applies to created happiness which consists in
Article 4: Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed?
Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end possessed. For
Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that "to enjoy is to use joyfully, with
the joy, not of hope, but of possession." But so long as a thing is not
had, there is joy, not of possession, but of hope. Therefore enjoyment is
only of the end possessed.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above (Article ), enjoyment is not properly
otherwise than of the last end: because this alone gives rest to the
appetite. But the appetite has no rest save in the possession of the end.
Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end possessed.
Objection 3: Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But one does not
lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end. Therefore
enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
On the contrary, "to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its
own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this is
possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our possession.
Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not possessed.
I answer that, To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the
last end, according as the will has something by way of last end. Now an
end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly, when
it is possessed not only in intention but also in reality; imperfectly,
when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment, therefore, is
of the end already possessed: but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end
possessed not really, but only in intention.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.
Reply to Objection 2: The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest. First
on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the last end, but
ordained to something else: secondly on the part of the one who desires
the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of it. Now it is
the object that specifies an act: but on the agent depends the manner of
acting, so that the act be perfect or imperfect, as compared with the
actual circumstances of the agent. Therefore enjoyment of anything but
the last end is not enjoyment properly speaking, as falling short of the
nature of enjoyment. But enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is
enjoyment properly speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect
way in which it is possessed.
Reply to Objection 3: One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not only in
reality, but also in intention, as stated above.