QUESTION 4: OF THE TIME FOR CONTRITION
We must now consider the time for contrition: under which head there are
three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?
(2) Whether it is expedient to grieve continually for our sins?
(3) Whether souls grieve for their sins even after this life?
Article 1: Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the time for contrition is not the whole of
this life. For as we should be sorry for a sin committed, so should we be
ashamed of it. But shame for sin does not last all one's life, for
Ambrose says (De Poenit. ii) that "he whose sin is forgiven has nothing
to be ashamed of." Therefore it seems that neither should contrition last
all one's life, since it is sorrow for sin.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 4:18) that "perfect charity casteth
out fear, because fear hath pain." But sorrow also has pain. Therefore
the sorrow of contrition cannot remain in the state of perfect charity.
Objection 3: Further, there cannot be any sorrow for the past (since it is,
properly speaking, about a present evil) except in so far as something of
the past sin remains in the present time. Now, in this life, sometimes
one attains to a state in which nothing remains of a past sin, neither
disposition, nor guilt, nor any debt of punishment. Therefore there is no
need to grieve any more for that sin.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Rm. 8:28) that "to them that love God all
things work together unto good," even sins as a gloss declares
[*Augustine, De Correp. et Grat.]. Therefore there is no need for them to
grieve for sin after it has been forgiven.
Objection 5: Further, contrition is a part of Penance, condivided with
satisfaction. But there is no need for continual satisfaction. Therefore
contrition for sin need not be continual.
On the contrary, Augustine in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa
Poenitentia, work of an unknown author] says that "when sorrow ceases,
penance fails, and when penance fails, no pardon remains." Therefore,
since it behooves one not to lose the forgiveness which has been granted,
it seems that one ought always to grieve for one's sins.
Further, it is written (Ecclus. 5:5): "Be not without fear about sin
forgiven." Therefore man should always grieve, that his sins may be
I answer that, As stated above (Question , Article ), there is a twofold sorrow
in contrition: one is in the reason, and is detestation of the sin
committed; the other is in the sensitive part, and results from the
former: and as regards both, the time for contrition is the whole of the
present state of life. For as long as one is a wayfarer, one detests the
obstacles which retard or hinder one from reaching the end of the way.
Wherefore, since past sin retards the course of our life towards God
(because the time which was given to us for the course cannot be
recovered), it follows that the state of contrition remains during the
whole of this lifetime, as regards the detestation of sin. The same is to
be said of the sensible sorrow, which is assumed by the will as a
punishment: for since man, by sinning, deserved everlasting punishment,
and sinned against the eternal God, the everlasting punishment being
commuted into a temporal one, sorrow ought to remain during the whole of
man's eternity, i.e. during the whole of the state of this life. For this
reason Hugh of St. Victor says [*Richard of St. Victor, De Pot. Lig. et
Solv. 3,5,13] that "when God absolves a man from eternal guilt and
punishment, He binds him with a chain of eternal detestation of sin."
Reply to Objection 1: Shame regards sin only as a disgraceful act; wherefore
after sin has been taken away as to its guilt, there is no further motive
for shame; but there does remain a motive of sorrow, which is for the
guilt, not only as being something disgraceful, but also as having a hurt
connected with it.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear which charity casts out, is opposed to charity
by reason of its servility, because it regards the punishment. But the
sorrow of contrition results from charity, as stated above (Question , Article ):
wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Although, by penance, the sinner returns to his former
state of grace and immunity from the debt of punishment, yet he never
returns to his former dignity of innocence, and so something always
remains from his past sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as a man ought not to do evil that good may come of
it, so he ought not to rejoice in evil, for the reason that good may
perchance come from it through the agency of Divine grace or providence,
because his sins did not cause but hindered those goods; rather was it
Divine providence that was their cause, and in this man should rejoice,
whereas he should grieve for his sins.
Reply to Objection 5: Satisfaction depends on the punishment appointed, which
should be enjoined for sins; hence it can come to an end, so that there
be no further need of satisfaction. But that punishment is proportionate
to sin chiefly on the part of its adherence to a creature whence it
derives its finiteness. On the other hand, the sorrow of contrition
corresponds to sin on the part of the aversion, whence it derives a
certain infinity; wherefore contrition ought to continue always; nor is
it unreasonable if that which precedes remains, when that which follows
is taken away.
Article 2: Whether it is expedient to grieve for sin continually?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to grieve for sin
continually. For it is sometimes expedient to rejoice, as is evident from
Phil. 4:4, where the gloss on the words, "Rejoice in the Lord always,"
says that "it is necessary to rejoice." Now it is not possible to rejoice
and grieve at the same time. Therefore it is not expedient to grieve for
Objection 2: Further, that which, in itself, is an evil and a thing to be
avoided should not be taken upon oneself, except in so far as it is
necessary as a remedy against something, as in the case of burning or
cutting a wound. Now sorrow is in itself an evil; wherefore it is written
(Ecclus. 30:24): "Drive away sadness far from thee," and the reason is
given (Ecclus. 30:25): "For sadness hath killed many, and there is no
profit in it." Moreover the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. vii, 13,14;
x, 5). Therefore one should not grieve for sin any longer than suffices
for the sin to be blotted out. Now sin is already blotted out after the
first sorrow of contrition. Therefore it is not expedient to grieve any
Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (Serm. xi in Cant.): "Sorrow is a good
thing, if it is not continual; for honey should be mingled with
wormwood." Therefore it seems that it is inexpedient to grieve
On the contrary, Augustine [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an
unknown author] says: "The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice in
Further, it is expedient always to continue, as far as it is possible,
those acts in which beatitude consists. Now such is sorrow for sin, as is
shown by the words of Mt. 5:5, "Blessed are they that mourn." Therefore
it is expedient for sorrow to be as continual as possible.
I answer that, We find this condition in the acts of the virtues, that
in them excess and defect are not possible, as is proved in Ethic. ii,
6,7. Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a kind of displeasure
seated in the rational appetite, is an act of the virtue of penance,
there can never be excess in it, either as to its intensity, or as to its
duration, except in so far as the act of one virtue hinders the act of
another which is more urgent for the time being. Consequently the more
continually a man can perform acts of this displeasure, the better it
is, provided he exercises the acts of other virtues when and how he ought
to. On the other hand, passions can have excess and defect, both in
intensity and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow, which the
will takes upon itself, ought to be moderately intense, so ought it to be
of moderate duration, lest, if it should last too long, man fall into
despair, cowardice, and such like vices.
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow of contrition is a hindrance to worldly joy, but
not to the joy which is about God, and which has sorrow itself for object.
Reply to Objection 2: The words of Ecclesiasticus refer to worldly joy: and the
Philosopher is referring to sorrow as a passion, of which we should make
moderate use, according as the end, for which it is assumed, demands.
Reply to Objection 3: Bernard is speaking of sorrow as a passion.
Article 3: Whether our souls are contrite for sins even after this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that our souls are contrite for sins even after
this life. For the love of charity causes displeasure at sin. Now, after
this life, charity remains in some, both as to its act and as to its
habit, since "charity never falleth away." Therefore the displeasure at
the sin committed, which is the essence of contrition, remains.
Objection 2: Further, we should grieve more for sin than for punishment. But
the souls in purgatory grieve for their sensible punishment and for the
delay of glory. Much more, therefore, do they grieve for the sins they
Objection 3: Further, the pain of purgatory satisfies for sin. But
satisfaction derives its efficacy from the power of contrition. Therefore
contrition remains after this life.
On the contrary, contrition is a part of the sacrament of Penance. But
the sacraments do not endure after this life. Neither, therefore, does
Further, contrition can be so great as to blot out both guilt and
punishment. If therefore the souls in purgatory could have contrition, it
would be possible for their debt of punishment to be remitted through the
power of their contrition, so that they would be delivered from their
sensible pain, which is false.
I answer that, Three things are to be observed in contrition: first, its
genus, viz. sorrow; secondly, its form, for it is an act of virtue
quickened by charity; thirdly, its efficacy, for it is a meritorious and
sacramental act, and, to a certain extent, satisfactory. Accordingly,
after this life, those souls which dwell in the heavenly country, cannot
have contrition, because they are void of sorrow by reason of the
fulness of their joy: those which are in hell, have no contrition, for
although they have sorrow, they lack the grace which quickens sorrow;
while those which are in purgatory have a sorrow for their sins, that is
quickened by grace; yet it is not meritorious, for they are not in the
state of meriting. In this life, however, all these three can be found.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity does not cause this sorrow, save in those who are
capable of it; but the fulness of joy in the Blessed excludes all
capability of sorrow from them: wherefore, though they have charity, they
have no contrition.
Reply to Objection 2: The souls in purgatory grieve for their sins; but their
sorrow is not contrition, because it lacks the efficacy of contrition.
Reply to Objection 3: The pain which the souls suffer in purgatory, cannot,
properly speaking, be called satisfaction, because satisfaction demands a
meritorious work; yet, in a broad sense, the payment of the punishment
due may be called satisfaction.