QUESTION 2: OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS
We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what
it is; (3) how we can obtain it.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?
(2) Whether in honor?
(3) Whether in fame or glory?
(4) Whether in power?
(5) Whether in any good of the body?
(6) Whether in pleasure?
(7) Whether in any good of the soul?
(8) Whether in any created good?
Article 1: Whether man's happiness consists in wealth?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. For since
happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which has the
greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written
(Eccles. 10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore man's happiness
consists in wealth.
Objection 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is "a
state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." Now
money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, that it might be a
sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore
happiness consists in wealth.
Objection 3: Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more than anything else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches" (Eccles. 5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.
On the contrary, Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than
in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), "wealth shines in
giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the
generous man is applauded." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in
I answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in
wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3),
viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a
remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars,
dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a
direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art of man, for
the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things salable.
Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural wealth.
For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something else, viz. as
a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man's last end,
rather is it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore in the order of
nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to Ps.
8:8: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet."
And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of
natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, by its means,
he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less
can it be considered in the light of the last end. Therefore it is
impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in
Reply to Objection 1: All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of
fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be
obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not
from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is for a person whose
sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.
Reply to Objection 2: All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual
things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (Prov. 17:16): "What
doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom."
Reply to Objection 3: The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they
suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial
wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence,
which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i, 3). Yet
this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the
sovereign good. For the more perfectly the sovereign good is possessed,
the more it is loved, and other things despised: because the more we
possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:29):
"They that eat me shall yet hunger." Whereas in the desire for wealth and
for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is the case: for when we
already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the
sense of Our Lord's words (Jn. 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this water,"
by which temporal goods are signified, "shall thirst again." The reason
of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them:
and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good
does not consist therein.
Article 2: Whether man's happiness consists in honors?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. For
happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by
which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).
Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.
Objection 2: Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:17): "To . . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore happiness consists in honor.
Objection 3: Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But
nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers loss in
all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore
happiness consists in honor.
On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the
honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the
person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore
happiness does not consist in honor.
I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For
honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and
consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in
the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion, especially
to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its parts, i.e.
those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore
honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that
reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive honor
from men by way of reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to
offer." But virtue's true reward is happiness itself, for which the
virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a
virtue, but ambition.
Reply to Objection 2: Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a
sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that honor makes
Reply to Objection 3: That man desires honor above all else, arises from his
natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated above.
Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose
judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy.
Article 3: Whether man's happiness consists in fame or glory?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. For
happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints for the
trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the
Apostle says (Rm. 8:18): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy to
be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us."
Therefore happiness consists in glory.
Objection 2: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius
(Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge of
others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose
[*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory consists "in being well
known and praised." Therefore man's happiness consists in glory.
Objection 3: Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to
be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after a fashion.
Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): "You seem to beget unto yourselves
eternity, when you think of your fame in future time." Therefore man's
happiness consists in fame or glory.
On the contrary, Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that fame
or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "many owe their
renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more
shameful? For those who receive false fame, must needs blush at their own
praise." Therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory.
I answer that, Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory.
For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as Ambrose
[*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is
related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's knowledge: for human
knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God's knowledge is the
cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection of human good, which
is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge: but rather
human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion,
is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently
man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's
good depends on God's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's
beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God;
according to Ps. 90:15,16: "I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I
will fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation."
Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails,
especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this
reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be
deceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written (2 Cor. 10:18):
"He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth."
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with
men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence it is
written (Mk. 8:38): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His
Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins Mk. 8:38 with Lk. 12:8
owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was
quoting from memory].
Reply to Objection 2: A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the
knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived from
good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or
inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize
with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as
famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy.
Reply to Objection 3: Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever.
Article 4: Whether man's happiness consists in power?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things
desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first beginning.
But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to
be most like to God: hence also in Scripture they are called "gods" (Ex. 22:28), "Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods." Therefore happiness
consists in power.
Objection 2: Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest
perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to those
who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.
Objection 3: Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary
to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than aught else, men
shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists
On the contrary, Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most
imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "the power of man
cannot relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of
anxiety": and further on: "Think you a man is powerful who is surrounded
by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still
I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and
this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle, as
is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end.
Secondly, because power has relation to good and evil: whereas happiness
is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist
in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.
Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists
in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, since happiness
is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the
foregoing can be found both in good and in evil men. Secondly, because,
since it is the nature of happiness to "satisfy of itself," as stated in
Ethic. i, 7, having gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good.
But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may still lack many
goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and
such like. Thirdly, because, since happiness is the perfect good, no evil
can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for
it is written (Eccles. 5:12) that "riches" are sometimes "kept to the
hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said of the other three.
Fourthly, because man is ordained to happiness through principles that
are in him; since he is ordained thereto naturally. Now the four goods
mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to
fortune; for which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it
is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.
Reply to Objection 1: God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power
otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it is not
enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he
become like Him in goodness also.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use
of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use
of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power:
therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme
good consists in power.
Article 5: Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily goods. For
it is written (Ecclus. 30:16): "There is no riches above the riches of
the health of the body." But happiness consists in that which is best.
Therefore it consists in the health of the body.
Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better
than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows. But for
man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since,
therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it seems that health of the
body belongs more than anything else to happiness.
Objection 3: Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle
from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the greater the
scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause
consists in its flowing into something, so the causality of the end
consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause
is that which flows into all things, so the last end is that which
attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that which is most
desired by all. Therefore man's happiness consists most of all in things
pertaining to his being, such as the health of the body.
On the contrary, Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness.
But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, by the
elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness.
Therefore man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body.
I answer that, It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in the
goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a thing
be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the
preservation of its being. Hence a captain does not intend as a last end,
the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained
to something else as its end, viz. to navigation. Now just as the ship is
entrusted to the captain that he may steer its course, so man is given
over to his will and reason; according to Ecclus. 15:14: "God made man
from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Now it
is evident that man is ordained to something as his end: since man is not
the supreme good. Therefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot
be the preservation of man's being.
Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be the
preservation of man's being, it could not be said that the end of man is
some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and body; and
though the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the being of the
human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (FP, Question , Article ); and
the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the
instruments for the man that puts them into motion, that by their means
he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the
goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is
man's last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so
are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it is with
reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which
are signified by "riches," just as the good of the soul is preferred to
all bodily goods.
Reply to Objection 2: Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being,
surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes
all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being
itself as participated in this or that thing, which does not possess the
whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of
any creature; then it is evident that being itself together with an
additional perfection is more excellent. Hence in the same passage
Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist,
and intelligent better than living things.
Reply to Objection 3: Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument
proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom every
perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion,
some desire as to being only, some as to living being, some as to being
which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few.
Article 6: Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure. For
since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something else,
but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to
anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in
wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists
principally in pleasure and delight.
Objection 2: Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than
the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the end consists in
its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most
the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end. Now this is
pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man's will
and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems
that man's last end, which is happiness, consists principally in pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire
is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even
irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore
happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses
to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad
ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we
should not say that the very beasts are happy too."
I answer that, Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the
name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13),
although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in
them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is
distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is
a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal. We
must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting
from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a
man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or
in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the
perfect good, is precisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is
a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent.
Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the
perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting
therefrom as its proper accident.
But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that
way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power of
the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the
body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man's perfect good. For since
the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of
the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain
infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul which are tied
down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as
compared to material things, since a form is, after a fashion, contracted
and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is,
in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows
the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect,
which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is
abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite number of singulars.
Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and
which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense, is not
man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of
the soul. Hence it is written (Wis. 7:9) that "all gold in comparison of
her, is as a little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither
happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire
delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus it
is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards
and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is desired for itself,
so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the
preposition "for" denote the final cause. But if it denote the formal or
rather the motive cause, thus delight is desirable for something else,
i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently
is its principle, and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is
desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.
Reply to Objection 2: The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from
the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of
our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures
are desired by the majority.
Reply to Objection 3: All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and
yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, as
stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the
supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some
good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and
Article 7: Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's
happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold: external
goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not
consist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above
(Articles ,5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the
good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we desire
money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he
desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than all other
goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from
the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired. Therefore
happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, however, in goods of
the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is
perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness is
something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the
body, as shown above (Article ). Therefore it is something belonging to the
soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.
On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that
which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake."
But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to
be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists in no good of the
I answer that, As stated above (Question , Article ), the end is twofold: namely,
the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the
attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last
end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or
something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as
something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing actually, from
being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially
virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its
fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last
end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end.
In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power,
habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good
fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for the
universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated good,
and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's
But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession
thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end,
thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last
end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing
itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and
makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness.
Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the
soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.
Reply to Objection 1: Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can
desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or act, but
also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way
nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness is a good
of the soul.
Reply to Objection 2: As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is
loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved as that
for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently
it is not the same kind of love in both cases. As to whether man loves
anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be
occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.
Reply to Objection 3: Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul,
is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness,
viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated
Article 8: Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom "unites the ends of
first things to the beginnings of second things," from which we may
gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the base of the higher
nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is
above man in the order of nature, as stated in FP, Question , Article , it seems
that man's happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.
Objection 2: Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to
it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for its end. But the
universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man
who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect.
Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.
Objection 3: Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural
desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good surpassing
his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include that good which
surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that man can be made happy
by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man's
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is
the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom it is
written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' (Ps. 143:15)."
I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's
happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite
altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained
to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man's appetite, is the
universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal
true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will, save the
universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God
alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore
God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps.
102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone
constitutes man's happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic
nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last
end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the
common object of happiness of all the blessed, as being the infinite and
Reply to Objection 2: If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further
end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, but
something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared
as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God, as to its
last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe,
but God himself.
Reply to Objection 3: Created good is not less than that good of which man is
capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is less
than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is
infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and in the
whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.