Chapter 32: That nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things

From the above it is clear that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and other things.

For an effect which does not receive the same form specifically as that by which the agent acts cannot receive the name derived from that form in a univocal sense: for the sun and the heat generated from the sun are not called hot univocally. Now the forms of things which God causes do not come to the species of the divine virtue, since they receive severally and particularly that which is in God simply and universally (ch. 28-29). It is evident, therefore, that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things.

Further. If an effect attains to the species of its cause, the name of the latter will not be predicated of it univocally, unless it receives the same specific form according to the same mode of being. For ‘house’ in art is not univocally the same as ‘house’ in matter, since the form of house has a dissimilar existence in each. Now, other things, even though they receive entirely the same form, do not receive it according to the same mode of being: for there is nothing in God that is not the divine being itself, as shown above (ch. 23), which does not apply to other things. Therefore, it is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and other things.

Moreover. Whatever is predicated of several things univocally is either genus, or species, or difference, or accident, or property. Now, nothing is predicated of God as genus or as difference, as we have proved above (ch. 24-25), and consequently neither as definition nor as species, which consists of genus and difference. Nor can anything be accidental to him, as was shown above (ch. 23), and consequently nothing is predicated of God either as accidental or as proper, for the proper is a kind of accident. It follows, therefore, that nothing is predicated of God and other things univocally.

Again. That which is predicated univocally of several things is more simple than either of them, at least in our way of understanding. Now nothing can be more simple than God, either in reality or in our way of understanding. Therefore, nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things.

Further. Whatever is predicated univocally of several things belongs by participation to each of the things of which it is predicated: for the species is said to participate in the genus, and the individual in the species. But nothing is said of God by participation, since whatever is participated is confined to the mode of a participated thing, and thus is possessed partially, and not according to every mode of perfection. It follows, therefore, that nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things.

Again. That which is predicated of several things according to priority and posteriority is certainly not predicated of them univocally, since that which comes first is included in the definition of what follows, as substance is in the definition of accident (considered as a being). If, therefore, we were to say ‘being’ univocally of substance and accident, it would follow that substance also should enter into the definition of being as predicated of substance, which is clearly impossible. Now, nothing is predicated in the same order of God and other things, but according to priority and posteriority, since all predicates of God are essential (for he is called ‘being’ because he is being itself, and ‘good’ because he is goodness itself), whereas predicates are applied to others by participation (thus Socrates is said to be a man not as though he were humanity itself, but because he has humanity). Therefore, it is impossible for any thing to be predicated univocally of God and other things.

Chapter 33: That not all terms applied to God and creatures are purely equivocal

It is also clear from what has been said that things predicated of God and other things are not all pure equivocations, as are the effects of an equivocal cause.

For in the effects of an equivocal cause we find no mutual order or relationship, and it is altogether accidental that the same name is applied to various things, for the name applied to one does not signify that it has any relationship to another. But it is not so with the terms applied to God and creatures, for, in employing these common terms, we consider the order of cause and effect, as is clear from what we have said (ch. 32). Therefore, certain things predicated of God and other things are not pure equivocations.

Moreover. Where there is pure equivocation, we observe no likeness of things, but merely sameness of name. Now things have some kind of likeness to God, as shown above (ch. 29). Therefore, it follows that they are not said of God by pure equivocation.

Again. When one thing is predicated of several by pure equivocation, we cannot be led from one to the knowledge of the other, for the knowledge of things depends not on words but on the meaning of names. Now, we come to the knowledge of divine things from our observation of other things, as shown above. Therefore, such things are not pure equivocations when said of God and other things.

Further. The use of equivocal terms breaks the continuity of an argument. Therefore, if nothing were said of God and creatures except by pure equivocation, no argument could be made by proceeding to God from creatures. But the contrary is evidenced by all who speak of divine things.

Moreover. It is useless to predicate a name of a thing unless by that name we understand something about that thing. Now, if names are predicated equivocally of God and creatures, we understand nothing of God by those names, since the meanings of those names are known to us only as applied to creatures. It would, therefore, be useless to say or prove about God that God is being, good, or any thing else of the kind.

If, however, it be asserted that by such terms we only know of God what he is not (namely, so that he is called ‘living’ because he is not in the genus of inanimate beings, and so forth), it follows at least that ‘living’ when said of God and creatures agrees in the negation of inanimate being: and thus it will not be a pure equivocation.

Chapter 34: That terms applied to God and creatures are said analogically

It follows, then, from what has been said (ch. 32-33) that those things which are said of God and other things are predicated neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically, that is, according to an order or relation to some one thing.

This happens in two ways. First, according as many things have a relation to some one thing: thus in relation to the one health, an animal is said to be ‘healthy’ as its subject, medicine as effective thereof, food as preserving it, and urine as its sign.

Second, according as an order or relation of two things may be observed not to some other thing, but to one of them. Thus being is said of substance and accident insofar as accident bears a relation to substance, and not as though substance and accident were referred to a third thing.

Accordingly, such names are not said of God and other things analogically in the first way, for it would be necessary to suppose something prior to God, but in the second way.

Now in this analogical predication the relationship is sometimes found to be the same both as to the name and as to the thing, and sometimes it is not the same. For the relationship of the name follows on the relationship of knowledge, since the name is the sign of intellectual conception. Accordingly, when that which comes first in reality is found to be first also in knowledge, the same thing is found to be first both as to the meaning of the name and as to the nature of the thing. Thus substance is prior to accident both in nature (inasmuch as substance is the cause of accident), and in knowledge (inasmuch as substance is placed in the definition of accident). Therefore, ‘being’ is said of substance prior to being said of accident, both in reality and according to the meaning of the word. On the other hand, when that which comes first according to nature comes afterwards according to knowledge, then, in analogical terms, there is not the same order according to the reality and according to the meaning of the name. Thus the healing power in health-giving medicine is naturally prior to health in the animal, as cause is prior to effect; yet, as we know this power through its effect, we name it from that effect. Hence it is that ‘health-giving’ is first in the order of reality, and yet ‘healthy’ is predicated of animal first according to the meaning of the term.

Accordingly, since we arrive at the knowledge of God from other things, the reality of the names predicated of God and other things is first in God according to his mode, but the meaning of the name is in him afterwards. Therefore, he is said to be named from his effects.

Chapter 35: That the several names predicated of God are not synonymous

From what we have said it is also proved that although names predicated of God signify the same thing, they are not synonymous, because they do not convey the same meaning.

For just as various things are by their various forms like one simple thing (which is God), so our intellect is somewhat like him by its various conceptions, insofar as it is led to know him by the various perfections of creatures. Therefore, our understanding is neither false nor vain in conceiving many things about one thing; because that simple divine being is such that certain things can be likened to him according to their manifold forms, as we have proved above (ch. 29, 31). And, according to its various conceptions, our intellect devises various names which it applies to God. Therefore, since they are not applied with the same meaning, it is clear that they are not synonymous, although they signify a thing absolutely one: for the name does not have the same meaning, since it denotes the concept of the intellect prior to the thing understood.

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Summa Contra Gentiles bk. 1, cc. 32-35 | St. Thomas Aquinas